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ABSTRACT 
Trust plays a vital role in all aspects of life, affecting whether goals are met 
and the cost of achieving them.  It affects and is affected by culture, 
expectations, and behavior. This thesis examines the nature of trust and its role 
in military operations and winning “hearts and minds.” It also examines American 
foreign policy and its relation to trust.  Iraq is used as a case study to examine 
the interaction of U.S. foreign policy and operations with trust and culture. The 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
After the historical shift of global power from the British empire to the U.S., 
the United States of America became a real presence in the life of all nations of 
the world. Technological achievement made that process easier and rapid. 
Assuming the role of “super power” obligates the United States to maintain 
stability in other parts of the world. Subsequently, the world experienced a 
sequence of U.S. interventions; initially in the western hemisphere, later in all 
other parts of the world, and most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. But with all 
the good intentions of creating a better world, historical records indicate that in 
many cases U.S. intervention went sour. There has been much thought devoted 
to reviewing and relearning from those failures. Why did enjoying power and 
wealth in all aspects not bring success to various U.S. missions? Are there any 
missing components? In search of answers, this thesis attempts to focus on U.S. 
foreign policy as it always reflects a set of political goals that outline relational 
trust with another country. Relational trust is about one party trusting another 
party, which is based on expectations. This thesis will look for those missing 
expectations that are perceived as not being met. 
Trust remains a very important topic of study in the disciplines of 
sociology, psychology, political science, economics, and others. Trust, especially 
when winning “hearts and minds,” is the main factor determining the expense of 
everything else: time, money and human capital. It is imperative to understand 
the importance of trust in success of a mission so as to make winning “hearts” 
and “minds” a natural outcome of a mission rather than an “aim of the campaign.” 
Trust lies in the social norms of a society; the level and nature or type of trust will 
also depend on the nature or type of the social norms of that society. Norms are 
unwritten and often unspoken, yet they govern the normative behavior of a 
society. They can be felt (if not followed), and frequently experienced in an 
unfamiliar environment with a different culture. Since norms control behavior, 
introducing one’s own culture into a new culture often invites cultural 
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confrontation.  But this aspect has not received the attention in military doctrine 
that it deserves. As a result, the cultural norms of others are often ignored and 
violated without appreciating the expectation of the one expected to give trust.  
Trust is important to the formation of networks. Social scientists always 
refer to networks of trusted relationships and the resources available through 
these relationships, whereas military doctrine emphasizes building efficient 
networks, downplaying the importance of the trusted relationship. The measure 
of trust is never a simple and standard calculation. An economist may measure in 
terms of lending money and how much he is getting back from the trustee; 
skeptical readers may find some gap in surveys as the answers often vary in light 
of how questions are presented. Trust is intangible and difficult to measure. It can 
only be felt. In a military mission, feelings may get overridden by aims and 
objectives of the campaign, feelings of frustration over the resisting forces, a 
sense of domination and supremacy, etc. These feelings, more often than not, 
result in actions exactly opposite to those that can help in building trust. For 
military units, it is essential to remember how the people of other cultures view 
your actions, not only after, but also before and during the campaign.  It has to be 
remembered that the “occupiers” are the ones who have to gain the trust of the 
“occupied”; an effort more difficult than rebuilding infrastructure. Hence, in 
Chapter II this thesis briefly outlines the functions and benefits of trust as well as 
various levels of trust and the macro societal conditions of a trust culture for 
better understanding. 
In Chapter III, a brief outline is given of U.S. foreign policy, as foreign 
policy is a reliable indicator of a country’s political vision in establishing relational 
trust. In respect to U.S. foreign policy, this chapter refers to historian Walter 
Russell Mead, who provides an overview of American foreign policy that helps 
others understand the central ideas of the Americans. Mead, in his book Special 
Providence (2002), identifies four broad spectra of U.S. foreign policy by using 
four great politicians in U.S. history: Alexander Hamilton, Woodrow Wilson, 
Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson. He then traces how these four general 
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approaches to U.S. foreign policies have evolved over a period of time.  All four 
broad spectra helped shape and reshape U.S. interests at different stages in the 
country’s development. In this section, the Monroe Doctrine, Chinese Open Door 
policy, Kyoto protocol issue, Middle East crisis, Global War on Terror, and other 
examples are discussed. More attention has been directed to Iraq as an 
example, and a few dimensions are highlighted in search of missing components 
in winning “hearts and minds.” Evidence, documents, and events have been 
taken from various historical records when investigating why trust in the U.S. 
might be low in Iraq even before the U.S. invaded in March 2003. There are 
certain events that come to mind, such as not backing the dissident Shia 
following Gulf War I, the economic sanctions against Iraq, which hurt the general 
population, and the bombing of Iraqi civil targets in the name of military targets.  
After March 2003, there are things like Abu Ghraib and the Hadith incident, 
failure to stop looting and restore law and order. From another point of view, 
people in Iraq might have relatively low levels of trust in general that would be 
projected onto the U.S., aggravated by differences in culture and norms and by 
the events taking place closely around them. Lastly, though I am not optimistic 
about various methods to measure trust, I attempted to measure trust by 
following the Analysis of Competing Hypothesis (ACH) method developed by J. 
Richards Heurer, (1999). It is an eight-step procedure that helps analyze 
controversial issues.  
In Chapter IV, the conclusion and a few recommendations have been 


























The life cycle of living beings is greatly dependent on trust. Even in a 
jungle, animals know which other animals to trust or not. It becomes even more 
relevant in the case of humans. Our day to day lives are extremely dependent on 
others, and thus require a certain level of trust at all times. Depending on how 
one is brought up in a given environment, each individual tends to have a default 
level of trust. Even within an environment, each individual, by nature, has his own 
preset level of trust. Where few start any relationship at 100% trust (later scaling 
it down depending on good/bad experiences), others may start at 0-% trust; most 
are in between and raise or lower their innate settings depending on their positive 
or negative experiences. This kind of “natural” human behavior is shaped by the 
social norms and culture of a society. It is a pity that the importance of these 
norms and culture is often neglected without realizing their impact on gaining 
trust. Trust, especially when winning “hearts and minds” is the deciding factor at 
the expense of everything else: time, money and human capital. It is imperative 
to understand the importance of trust in the success of a mission so as to make 
winning “hearts” and “minds” a natural outcome of a mission rather than simply 
one more “aim of a campaign.”  
After the paradigm shift of global power from the British to the U.S., the 
United States of America became a real presence in the life of all nations of the 
world. Technological achievement made that process easier and rapid. Assuming 
the role of “superpower” obligates the United States to maintain stability in other 
parts of the world. Subsequently, we experienced a sequence of U.S. 
interventions initially in the western hemisphere, later in all other parts of the 
world, and most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. But with all the good intentions 
for a better world, historical records indicate that in many of these cases U.S. 
intervention went sour. There has been much thought devoted to reviewing and 
learning from those failures. Why did enjoying power and wealth in all aspects 
not bring success to various U.S. missions? Are there any missing components? 
In search of answers, this thesis attempts to focus on U.S. foreign policy, as it 
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reflects a set of political goals that outline relational trust with other countries. 
Relational trust is about one party trusting another party, which is based on 
expectations. This thesis will look for those missing expectations that are 
perceived as not being met. 
This thesis will also highlight specific missions like Iraq in search of 
missing components in winning “hearts and minds.” Evidence, documents, and 
events will be taken from various historical records when explaining why trust of 
the U.S. might have been low in Iraq even before the U.S. invaded in March 
2003. There are certain events that come to mind, such as not backing the 
dissident Shia following Gulf War- I, the economic sanctions against Iraq which 
hurt the general population, and the bombing of Iraqi civil targets in the name of 
military targets.  After March 2003, there are things like Abu Ghraib, the Hadith 
incident, and the failure to stop looting and restore law and order. People in Iraq 
might have relatively low levels of trust in general that would be projected onto 
the U.S., aggravated by differences in culture and norms and by events taking 
place.  
A. HYPOTHESIS 
In many cases, Americans pay attention to others’ norms and cultures but 
fail to see or understand. As a result, U.S. policy often ignores the values of 
others. The U.S. failure in various missions is due to lack of cultural knowledge 
over a period of time, which needs to be addressed in various U.S. policies and 
actions. The past failures/lessons learned shape in Americans’ model as they 
view that in their way. With that point of view, my hypothesis is this that U.S. 
foreign policy and military doctrine may have fallacies that need to be addressed. 
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II. DISCUSSION ON CREDIBILITY AND TRUST, AND THEIR 
IMPORTANCE TO MISSION SUCCESS DEFINING TRUST 
Trust remains a very important subject in the fields of sociology, 
psychology, political science, economics and others. The definition and type of 
trust also varies according to the lens being applied. Social scientist Sztompka 
(1999) suggests that trust greatly relates to human actions. To the extent that we 
cannot predict human action, there is always an associated fear of uncertainty 
and risk in the future. “Trust is intimately linked with the uncertainty of the future, 
as long as that uncertainty is of human and not purely natural provenance” 
(Sztompka 1999, p. 20). When we cannot overcome uncertainty or risk 
concerning someone, we in fact experience distrust.  
Many social scientists also relate trust to expectation and reciprocity. 
People will behave in an honest and generous way, expecting that such behavior 
will be reciprocated. Reciprocal exchange leads to trust:  “trust evokes trust.”  
From the above, we can define trust as an individual’s, group’s, society’s, 
or nation’s reliance or dependence on another person, group, society, or nation 
under conditions of uncertainty and risk, thus delegating limited power or 
authority for a positive expectation or reciprocation.  
A. LEVEL OF TRUST 
Measuring the level of trust remains a challenging job. The following 
aspects help us estimate the level of trust based on various conditions: 
1. Deterrence-Based Trust 
Shapiro, Sheppard and Cheraskin introduced this concept of trust based 
on assuring consistency of behavior. Here an individual will act out of fear and 
consequences of punishment for not doing an expected act. Lewicki and Bunker 
(1996) describe it as follows: 
Like any behavior based on a theory of deterrence, trust is 
sustained to the degree that the deterrent (punishment) is clear, 
possible, and likely to occur if the trust is violated. Thus, the threat 
of punishment is likely to be a more significant motivator than the 
promise of reward (p. 119). 
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2. Calculus - Based Trust 
The above form of trust is also termed calculus-based rather than 
deterrence-based trust. In the opinion of Lewicki and Bunker, this form of trust is 
grounded in the fear of punishment for violation as well as in the rewards for 
keeping it.  
Trust is an ongoing, market-oriented, economic calculation whose 
value is derived by determining the outcomes resulting from 
creating and sustaining the relationship relative to the costs of 
maintaining or severing it (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996, p. 120).  
In my opinion, deterrence-based trust is separate and distinct from 
calculus-based trust as “deterrence”, by definition, leaves no margin for reward. 
Hence, I will use the term calculus based trust where there is reward and 
punishment simultaneously. 
3. Knowledge - Based Trust 
In this form of trust, there is less uncertainty or risk, as the trustee is 
sufficiently known and his behavior is anticipatable. However, even though 
known behavior scales down the risk or uncertainty, due to dependence on 
others, there is still risk. According to Dr. Dorothy Denning (personal 
communication via email on March 11, 2006),  
Humans make mistakes, and circumstances can arise that alter 
commitments and priorities. People also change, and our 
knowledge of them is never complete. Obviously, the more you 
know a person, the more certain you can be of your assessment 
about their trustworthiness, and so the risk to you is much lower 
than when you don’t have any first-hand knowledge. 
4. Identification - Based Trust 
This form of trust is usually stronger than knowledge based trust. It comes 
after interactions and interpersonal transactions, and not before. Here one is so 
confident that one does not even feel it necessary to monitor others. In this form 
of trust, one acts as an agent of others, supporting somebody on the basis of 
something shared like marriage, family, country, city, religion, unit, cause etc. 
According to Lewicki and Bunker,  
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A corollary of this ‘acting for each other’ in identification based trust 
is that as both knowledge and identification develop, the parties not 
only know and identify with each other but come to understand 
what they must do to sustain the other’s trust (1996, p. 123).  
In another sense, we can describe this as a form of trust where a person 
places his trust in others instantly without any hesitation due to a shared common 
identity. Due to interaction over some period of time, this form of trust 
strengthens knowledge-based trust. Actually, common identity itself leads to 
resources of knowing each other instantly. 
B. FACTORS EFFECTING TRUST 
In our daily life, we are interacting with people in different social roles 
whose action varies according to their positions. Judges, doctors, priests, 
notaries public, and others generally reflect a trustworthy image, although these 
images vary across different societies. People also place trust in institutions and 
organizations like schools, colleges, courts, banks, and military organizations. 
We often emphasize testimonies and reference to assess the trustworthiness of 
a person or group. Similarly, people measure trustworthiness through 
performance, reputation, and appearance. But all these depend on expectation. If 
expectations are not fulfilled, distrust arises.   
In relation to expectation, Sztomka (1999) introduces instrumental, 
axiological and fiduciary trust based on capability, integrity, and benevolence 
respectively. Acting reliably, efficiently, morally, and benevolently often reflects 
trustworthiness. The level of expectation is based on a pre-existent cultural 
context, underlying the social norms and values in the form of normative rules. 
These expectations are always associated with relational trust, which is about 
one party trusting another party. This trust is based on expectations relating to 
capability, integrity, and benevolence, and is established through appearance, 
performance, and reputation.  
C. BENEFITS OF TRUST 
The first and most obvious benefit of trusting is gaining trust in return: 
“Trust evokes trust”. Consequently, it scales down risk and uncertainty. It is also 
important in the formation of networks. It opens the opportunity for participation in 
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various local activities and allows interpersonal ties. If anyone wants to build a 
network, he or she has to somehow build trust. Trust limits exploitation and 
facilitates exchange. Currently, social scientists use quantifiers to describe trust 
in terms of transaction costs, as trust reduces monitoring and use of the legal 
system with its courts and law enforcement. Trust also facilitates cooperation, 
information sharing, and dealing with crises and conflicts. “High trust of the 
instrumental, axiological, and fiduciary type seems a prerequisite for battle 
effectiveness” (Sztompka, 1999, p. 65). 
D. TRUSTING IMPULSE  
According to Sztompka (1999, p. 98), various forms of trust - instrumental, 
axiological, or fiduciary - based on expectation, depend on the trusting impulse. 
More important to note is that the trusting impulse largely depends on early 
socialization in the family. Parents’ irrational love and care for their children gives 
birth to the fiduciary type trusting impulse. Later on, axiological expectations 
develop when children find themselves in friendship circles, games, 
neighborhoods where there is a question of fair play, keeping promises and 
secrets, and being loyal. Instrumental type trust is the only form which starts to 
dominate only with professional life.  At all stages, if emerging trust is met 
consistently, the trusting impulse gradually embeds itself in the personality of an 
individual; if not, then the trusting impulse will not be able to grow and will remain 
paralyzed.    
E. THE CULTURE OF TRUST 
Sztompka (1999, p. 122) outlines five macro-societal conditions that lead 
to the culture of trust or distrust:  
1. Normative Coherence versus Normative Chaos 
In this form, a set of norms - of law, morality, and customs - provides the 
basis of social life. These sets of norms make social life secure and 
unproblematic, orderly, and predictable as they regulate the function of social 
activity. Here, the normative effects of popularly endorsed beliefs, law, morality, 
and customs drive most social activity towards a fixed scenario, influencing what 
people should and will do. This causes social stability in the society.  
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Such normative ordering of social life raises the likelihood that other 
people will meet our expectation. The feeling of existential security 
and certainty encourages the bets of predictive trust. But apart from 
that, there are enforceable norms more immediately relevant for 
trust, demanding honesty, loyalty, and reciprocity. Their presence 
raises the likelihood of such conduct, and assures us that our bets 
of entrusting, as well as evocative trust, will also be met; that 
partners will fulfill obligation, and give us mutual trust (1999, p. 
122).  
On the other hand, there are always anomalies in social activity which 
evoke feelings of insecurity and uncertainty. These feelings can lead to 
withholding trust. “People lose any clear idea of binding obligations, and nobody 
cares to enforce them. Hence the likelihood of repaid or reciprocated trust 
collapses” (Sztompka 1999, p. 122). 
2. Stability of Social Order versus Radical Change 
This macro-societal condition refers to the linked network of groups, 
associations, institutions, and organizations, which preserve the normal ways of 
feelings for society, and support and comfort for social life. Under stability, all 
these features of society remain reasonably constant over time and continually 
reproduce the system of institutions, customs, and patterns of interaction. 
“Repeated routines that people follow make it possible to predict their conduct” 
(Sztompka, 1999, p. 123).  
By contrast, under circumstances of radical change, people are faced with 
new features of social life: groups, associations, institutions, organizations, 
regimes. As a result, feelings of division, insecurity, and uneasiness arise where 
the probability of breaching predictive trust is high. It is true that social order is 
hardly absolute and that change is compatible with trust, “only if it proceeds 
gradually, regularly, predictably, in a slow rhythm and consistence direction” 
(Sztompka, 1999, p. 123).  
3. Transparency versus Pervasive Secrecy 
Transparency refers to openness. Putting this another way, transparency 
refers to freedom of information, and the availability of information about groups, 
associations, institutions, organizations, and regimes. Transparency in a social 
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structure provides the feeling of security and predictability as it leads to 
participation by all. Here, people try to be more honest if they know that their 
words will be published. Conversely, secrecy leads to suspicion, rumors, and 
gossip. In this situation, people hesitate to place trust. 
4. Familiarity versus Strangeness of the Environment 
Here Sztompka includes all components of the environment such as 
landscape, topography, architecture, interiors, designs, colors, taste, smells, 
images, and so forth as all these elements influence social routine and behavior, 
thus affecting the building of trust. 
[Familiarity] provides one with the feeling of security, certainty, 
predictability, comfort. In effect, it produces a trust-generating 
atmosphere, where it is easier to believe that trusting predictions 
will be born out, that entrusted values will be cared for and 
returned, and that others will reciprocate with mutual trust 
(Sztompka, 1999, p. 124). 
In contrast, people react with suspicion and distrust when they confront a 
completely different, strange environment. 
5. Accountability versus Arbitrariness and Irresponsibility 
Accountability sets standards, provides checks and balances, and controls 
conduct, thus diminishing the danger of abuse. This stimulates a more trustful 
environment. People feel helpless where standards are absent. 
The above five macro-societal conditions affect a society’s level of trust or 
distrust. But the result also depends on people’s actions and decisions, which are 
influenced by emotions, thoughts, and behavior patterns that an individual has 
developed, and personality traits which can vary immensely between individuals. 
Individuals join in structural opportunities which are open to them through the 
above mentioned societal conditions, and act as independent variables in a trust 
culture. Individual participation in macro-societal conditions results in a specific 
praxis.  
There are two types of characteristics that seem to count most for 
the praxis of trust. There is first a certain personality syndrome 
correlated with trustfulness. It includes, as most directly relevant, 
the trusting impulse plus probably such personal traits indirectly 
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linked with readiness to trust as general activism rather than 
passivism, optimism rather than pessimism, future orientation 
rather than a presentist or traditionalist orientation, high aspirations 
rather than low aspirations, success orientation rather than 
adaptive orientation, innovative drive rather than conformity 
proneness. The opposite syndrome seems to contribute to the 
emergence of a culture of distrust (Sztompka, 1999, p. 125). 
Trusting impulse, activism, optimism, future orientation, high aspiration, 
and success orientation - all these elements form a social mood and either 
encourage or block the growth of a trust culture. Similarly, wealth, a secure job, 
plurality of roles, power, education, social networks, robust family, religious 
beliefs – all these elements defined as collective capital act as insurance and a 
safety net. As a result, those who are rich in all these components of collective 
capital place their trust easily. Lack of these elements of collective capital 
produces insecurity due to the absence of a safety net. Accordingly, social mood 
and collective capital all together act as mediating variables that affect the trust 
culture of the society. 
F. IMPORTANCE TO MISSION SUCCESS 
Trust plays a vital role in mission success, but grounding trust is also hard 
to achieve. Previously, we mentioned trustworthiness and efficiency as important 
factors influencing expectations. We believe that efficiency, capability, integrity 
and benevolence are all important factors while on a mission as they are 
expected by all people. But the level and form of expectation varies across 
cultures. Very often a military unit while on a mission confronts culturally different 
people and societies. Building trust in a culturally different environment is a very 
sensitive issue. Each culture has its own manner of interpreting events; the 
difference between cultural norms is enough to create misunderstanding before 
one has had a chance to prove one’s good will.  
Trust lies in the social norms of a society; the level and type of trust will 
also depend on the type of the social norms of that society. Norms are unwritten 
and often unspoken, yet they govern the normative behavior of that society. They 
can be felt (if not followed), and frequently experienced in an unfamiliar 
environment with a different culture. Norms control behavior; introducing one’s 
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own culture into a new culture often invites cultural confrontation.  But this aspect 
never gets paid attention in military doctrine. As a result we often ignore and 
violate the cultural norms of others without appreciating the expectations of those 
we seek trust from. 
Trust is important to the formation of networks. Social scientists always 
refer to networks of trusted relationships and the resources available through 
these relationships, whereas military doctrine emphasizes building efficient 
networks, giving the trusted relationship a lower value. A military team, if a part of 
the occupying force, has to be careful while interacting with civil society as the 
level of trust is solely based on deterrence and calculus based trust. This level of 
trust, where there is a threat and a promise, is not always conducive to good 
relations.  
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III. ASSESSMENT OF U.S. TRUSTWORTHINESS REGARDING 
RELATIONAL TRUST, INCLUDING SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS 
AND REASONS  
A. THE BROAD SPECTRA OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
It was mentioned earlier that foreign policy always reflects a country’s 
political vision in establishing relational trust. Hence, let us focus on U.S. foreign 
policy to determine whether it has any role in affecting relational trust. We have 
seen in the previous chapter that this trust is based on expectations relating to 
benevolence, integrity, and capability; and is established through appearance, 
performance, and reputation of the person in whom we place our trust. Here, 
instead of an individual we will consider a sovereign state’s performance, 
appearance, and reputation. In respect to U.S. foreign policy, historian Walter 
Russell Mead provides an overview of American foreign policy that will help us 
understand the central ideas of the Americans that have guided American foreign 
policy. Mead, in his book Special Providence (2002), identifies four broad 
approaches of U.S. foreign policy by concentrating on four great politicians in 
U.S. history. 
Hamiltonian - Alexander Hamilton (January 11, 1757 – July 12, 1804) was 
a leading American statesman and the first United States Secretary of the 
Treasury. His view is often termed “American realism.” Hamiltonians stress open 
seas, open markets and emphasize the importance of industry and commerce.  
Though present day Hamiltonians support free trade, they were in fact very 
protectionist, favoring New England manufacturers prior to WW II and never 
supported free trade rights for foreign goods. In brief, Hamiltonian principles are: 
• Strong economic foundation backed by strong federal government. 
• Freedom of air/sea. 
• Free trade and benefits of nation status. 
• Taxes to protect U.S. industries. 
• “Strategic” material protection. 
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Wilsonian – Woodrow Wilson (December 28, 1856 – February 3, 1924) 
was the 28th president of the United States (1913 – 1921). His policy came to be 
the most influential since early in the 19th century. Common principles that are 
often described as “Wilsonian” includes: 
• Advocacy of self-determination by ethnic groups. 
• Advocacy of the spread of democracy. 
• Anti-isolationism, in favor of intervention to help create peace and/ 
or spread freedom. 
Overall, Wilsonian principles are often characterized as being motivated 
by benevolence and ideology, rather than strict self-interest and fear. 
Wilsonianism also is equated with idealism. Idealism holds that a state should 
make its internal political philosophy the goal of its foreign policy. Wilson’s 
idealism was a precursor to liberal international relations theory, which would 
arise amongst the “institution-builders” after World War II.  One of the most well-
known tenets of modern idealist thinking is the democratic peace theory, which 
holds that states with similar modes of democratic governance do not fight one 
another. 
Jeffersonian – Thomas Jefferson (April 13, 1743 – July 4, 1826) was the 
third president of the United States (1801- 1809). Many politicians label him an 
isolationist as he viewed international objectives as too ambitious and far 
reaching. He also encouraged the reduction of international commitments. His 
key views reflect the following: 
• Resistant to foreign influence 
• Concerned only with the interests of the United States. 
• Foreign policy defends American values at home rather than 
extend them abroad 
• Subscribed to egalitarianism 
Jacksonian – Andrew Jackson (March 15, 1767 – June 8, 1845) was the 
7th president of the United States (1829 – 1837). U.S. interests were the core of 
his foreign policy. He believed that foreign policy existed only to protect American 
culture, society, and political heritage. He viewed war as a legitimate means to  
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solve foreign problems where there are no rules for international conflict. This 
school of thought supports the nation’s martial class, where many have been 
politically strengthened by their war records.  
B. VARIOUS POLICIES 
In fact, to understand U.S. policy we need to study various policies that 
were issued during various regimes over a period of time. The Monroe Doctrine, 
a policy issued by former U.S. President James Monroe on Dec 2, 1823, reflects 
three major ideas: 
• European countries cannot colonize any of North, Central, or South 
America. 
• The U.S. will only be involved in European affairs if America's rights 
are disturbed.  
• The U.S. will consider any attempt at colonization in the western 
hemisphere a threat to its national security. 
If we analyze the key ideas of this doctrine, it is very clear that this policy 
is designed to oppose European meddling in the western hemisphere and seeks 
the right of unilateral intervention. Later on, President Theodore Roosevelt added 
that Latin America was to be considered an area for U.S. commercial interests. 
Subsequently, we have seen many interventions by the U.S. (Cuba in 1906-
1910; Nicaragua in 1909-1911, 1912-1925 and 1926-1933; Haiti in 1915-1934; 
and the Dominican Republic in 1916-1924). In contrast, in 1898, when the 
partition of China by the European powers and Japan was imminent, U.S. 
Secretary of State John Hay, in 1899, sent notes to the major powers of Europe 
requesting continuation of free use of treaty ports within their spheres of 
influence in China. In fact, Hay demanded that no nation had the right to exclude 
other states from trade. Though these two policies – the Open Door policy and 
the Monroe Doctrine - contradict each other, they served the interest of 
Hamiltonians as both met U.S. economic interests. One could argue that here is 
no harm in this, since every sovereign state acts in its own interest. But 




western hemisphere and seek rights for your activities through an “Open Door” 
policy elsewhere. Here, people find duality, a double standard logic, and lack of 
consistency in the present and past policies of a state.   
The Monroe Doctrine stopped European power in the western hemisphere 
and at the same time opened the door to U.S. unilateral rights over the entire 
western hemisphere. As a result, expansion of territory in the name of Manifest 
Destiny was easier. The term “Manifest Destiny” is used to express the belief that 
the U.S. form of democratic freedom would spread across the North American 
continent. It was first used by Jacksonians in the 1840’s to promote annexation of 
territory. Though this ideology was used by Jacksonians, the Hamiltonians could 
also have interpreted it as beneficial, as it gave the American public the ability to 
acquire natural resources at minimal cost as they established rights to land 
across America.  Manufacturers would not have to pay tariffs on imported 
resources that were now available within America’s borders.  Cheaper resources 
meant bigger profits for manufacturers.  
Not only on the North American continent as we have seen from history, 
but also in other parts of the world, U.S. leaders (Wilsonians and others) have 
believed that part of their responsibility has been to spread the U.S. form of 
democracy and freedom, up until the present day. As a result, it should be very 
natural that the U.S. would promote strong democratic institutions and practices 
as well as the active role of civil society in the governance of a state. 
Unfortunately, over the last few decades, a picture has been painted that as long 
as the U.S. secures its own interest, all forms of governance, including a military 
regime, also suit the U.S. The recent military coup by General Parvez Musharraf 
in Pakistan could only have survived by satisfying U.S. demands concerning 
Taliban terrorists. General Musharraf was successful in obtaining F-16 fighters 
which had been held back for the last fifteen years. This recent behavior takes 
the global community back to the cold war era when Afghanistan was occupied 
by the former U.S.S.R. The same cause – securing U.S. interests by 
undermining the U.S.S.R led the U.S. to build good relations with Pakistan in a 
military regime led by General Ziaul Haque. After the defeat of the U.S.S.R, it 
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was unfortunate that Pakistan alone was left to deal with the derailed 
Mujahideen, whom the U.S. had helped train.  This didn’t immediately affect the 
global community beyond Pakistan, but it did scale signal the untrustworthiness 
of the U.S. due to this dual policy.   
Wilsonian lobbies always demand strong action against countries that do 
things they oppose, like oppress dissidents, permit the genital mutilation of 
women, and hunt whales in order to uphold moral values. But the global 
community never heard a single voice from the government about Saudi Arabia, 
where women are not allowed to drive – the only Muslim country in the world to 
keep women from doing so. Can we term the Saudi regime as a suitable form of 
democracy, even better than Iraq’s? If the answer is no, then why is the Saudi 
regime close to the U.S.? Practically, Saudi Arabia’s matters are always dealt 
with by high officials and often by the U.S. president alone (Roth, Greenburg, and 
Wille, n.d.). This suggests that Saudi Arabia is serving the U.S.’s greater interest, 
more specifically, oil – the “strategic” material as Hamiltonians would call it.  
Despite numerous peace agreements being signed, accords between 
Israel and the PLO, and innumerable additional efforts, the Palestine resistance 
is not yet over. Israeli actions against innocent Palestinians and Lebanese, and 
bombings against the Jewish community prove that a lasting peace in the Middle 
East is yet to be seen. Most Muslims attribute this situation to America’s 
unilateral economic and military support for Israel, which helped the process 
easier for Israel to be a nuclear power in that region with the help of France. But 
there was no criticism as we now hear in the case of Iran or North Korea. At 
present Israel gets the highest amount of aid from U.S. In 1997, Israel received a 
total of $5,525,800,000 in U.S. grants and loans (Washington Report).  
Does a good existing GDP and a country roughly the size of the state of 
New Jersey require that amount of grant aid? It requires it only when a country 
has to maintain an occupying status. One may argue the fact that Egypt likewise 
receives a huge amount in grants as a part of the deed to secure peace between 
Egypt and Israel. Again, many in the Muslim world view this as a part of a bribe 
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not to oppose Israel.  In fact, simply identifying Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist 
organizations and bombing them doesn’t suppress the truth. As Middle East 
expert Prof Glenn Robinson of Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) says, “Simply 
labeling Hamas as a terrorist organization misses the complex nature of Hamas 
as a social movement, which has significant theoretical and policy implications” 
(Lecture on class “Jihad Operations” on Oct 17, 2006).The analysis made by 
Professor Robinson shows that Hamas shares many of the same features of 
numerous social movements around the world. Simply labeling Hamas as a 
terrorist organization doesn’t reflect the true scenario that is made up of 
hundreds of thousands (perhaps millions) of Palestinian sympathizers who 
engage in extensive political and social activities (Hamas as Social, 2004). What 
we don’t understand is that technology can destroy material power but not ideals. 
Ideals can possibly intervene to some extent with a “Hearts and Minds” 
policy.The 2006 legislative election in Palestine, in which Hamas won 74 of the 
132 seats, proved that it is a social movement.  It is to be believed that in the 
Middle East, U.S. policy will never be viewed optimistically as long as the U.S. 
maintains such an unbalanced foreign policy about Israel, and Palestine is not 
changed. It is applicable for Hezbollah too.  My comments are further validated 
by Prof Robinson as he says, 
Hezbollah also qualifies as a social movement, quite clearly so.  I 
don't think the label “terrorist organization” is analytically useful and 
is meant for political purposes.  That does not mean that Hezbollah 
and, even more so, Hamas, do not undertake terrorist acts.  They 
do.  But so has every political-military group in history, some more, 
some less, including those that we revere. (Personal 
communication through e-mail with Prof. Glenn Robinson on 
October 17, 2006). 
We should look into this matter very seriously because the Organization of 
Islamic Conference’s (OIC) also reflected the same view in a meeting. The 




• The root cause of terrorism includes foreign occupation, injustice 
and exclusion. 
• Reject any attempt to associate Islamic States or Palestinians and 
Lebanese resistance with terrorism. 
• Reject any unilateral action taken against any Islamic country under 
the pretext of combating international terrorism (“Statement by 
Minister,” 2002) 
The present trend of global terrorism poses the greatest threat to the 
stability of the world. The 9/11 attack vividly demonstrated the threat of terrorism 
against security, prosperity, and peaceful development. Many do believe that the 
threat of indiscriminate violence against the people and governments of the U.S. 
is a natural outcome of U.S. Middle East policy.  
On September 20, 2001, in an address to a joint session of Congress and 
the American people President Bush declared the national strategy against 
global terrorism, which resulted in the February 14, 2003 publication of the 
National Strategy for Combating Terror. Since then, little about this has been 
changed. The National Strategy for Combating Terror outlines the U.S. 
government’s strategic intent, objectives and goals. But unfortunately the 
strategy has not brought the expected results. Rather, over the course of time the 
“Global War on Terror” (GWOT) turned into a “U.S. War on Terror” because 
means of achieving desired goals were neglected. The National Strategy for 
Combating Terror as preached has tended to implement ideas by force, while 
ignoring real facts that might have real consequences for the lives of others. 
Now, what should be our answer if other states of the world were ask question, 
“why should we be at your side after 9/11 when we suffered from the same acts 
of terrorism before 9/11?”  
People’s ideas, religions, culture and civilizations are very important 
concepts to incorporate in the strategy in order to win the “hearts and minds” of 
the opponent, but, these ideas and views are often neglected by U.S. planners. 
For example, developing countries are getting a huge amount of counter-
terrorism funds to fight this new war. But we all need to supervise those funds to 
optimize a better output. Bangladesh is one of the countries getting funds to 
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combat terrorism. Of several hundreds of Madrasas presently under surveillance, 
many have been forced to close down due to their so-called radical system of 
education, as viewed by U.S. policy. On October 30, 2006, eighty-two Madrasa 
students were killed in an air strike in the Bajaur tribal region in Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s military spokesman claimed all of them were militants. But how can it 
be claimed that the 12 teenagers among the victims were militants?  “Like many 
other residents, Sahibzada Haroon is convinced the seminary was bombed by 
U.S. drones, and Pakistan owned up to the air strikes up to cover up the whole 
incident and avoid embarrassment” (Khan, 2006, October 31).  
Unfortunately, the [U.S.] Army’s experience in war did not prepare it 
well for counterinsurgency, where the emphasis is on light infantry 
formations, not heavy divisions; on firepower restraint, not its 
widespread application; on the resolution of political and social 
problems within the nation targeted by insurgents, not closing with 
and destroying the insurgent’s field forces (Krepinevinch, Jr., 1986). 
In fact, all these actions generate more sympathizers and supporters for 
radicalism. The “U.S. War on Terror” policy should be funding those madrasas 
more to obligate them morally to teach the right interpretation of the Quran. But, 
instead of that, the state entities and ministries assigned this task are buying 
vehicles, equipment, technology, and creating new government offices, thus 
producing more bureaucracy similar to the U.S.’s Department of Homeland 
Security. Many analysts, like Dr. John Arquilla of NPS, view the Office of 
Homeland Security as just more “bureaucracy.” This is the way money is 
misused, and it may be assumed that the same consequences are taking place 
in a wide array of countries.  
If we change our focus to a different event, we will see another  type of 
destabilizing hazard in the form of global warming which threatens our existence. 
An amendment was brought to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997, known as the 
Kyoto protocol. This protocol requires a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
by 5.2% below 1990 levels by 2008-2012. Otherwise, scientists predict that the 
mean temperature of the earth will be 18 degrees C higher, which will cause 
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enormous melting from the ice of the Himalayas in South Asia, the Alps in 
Europe, and the other smaller mountains in other parts of the world. It reveals 
that with a one meter rise in sea level, more than a third of Shanghai, half of 
Bangladesh, and the whole Maldives Island would be under water. Australia 
would face severe drought (Brown, 2001). Holland is already living below sea 
level, protected by a long 42-foot artificial hill with a 150-foot thick base. As the 
sea level continues rising due to global warming, the Dutch government is 
expected to invest an extra U.S. $10 - $25 billion in flood and sea defenses 
(Geographic News, 2001). Scientists strongly believe that the series of wildfires 
that we are experiencing at present in different parts of the world are the 
evidence of affected climate (Doyle, 2003). Global warming is a scientific fact 
which all the nations of the world need to fight together. Upon this realization, 
one hundred and fifty three countries signed and ratified the Kyoto protocol to 
combat global warming. Unfortunately, the world’s top polluter, the United States, 
has not yet signed the protocol. How much sense does it make to raise public 
opinion against whale killing in order to protect the natural balance without 
signing the Kyoto protocol? The explanations scientists offer for global warming 
are debatable – but using this as an excuse to delay the on going process of 
Kyoto could equally be applied to whale killing. This also raises the same 
question of the U.S. by the affected countries as 9/11 does: “Why should we be 
at your side after 9/11 when we are suffering due to global warming and you are 
not at our side?” 
Recently signed coercive interrogation legislation by President George W. 
Bush on October 17, 2006 is the latest example of U.S. foreign policy which will 
create enormous resentment in the rest of the world. Under this law, terror 
suspects can not challenge their confinement. It undermines the Geneva 
conventions and reflects the U.S. concept of “might as right” that allows it to do 
what it wants to do. There is no poll result yet, but can be assumed that it will 
give birth to resentment among the world community and may be a tipping issue 
in Iraq and Palestine. Even U.S. citizens demonstrated their anger in front of the 
White House at the moment of signing. Similarly, when the U.S. Congress 
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passed the American Service Members’ Protection Act (in August 2002) against 
the position of the International Criminal Court, many wondered what justification 
the U.S. has to try men under suspicion in its own way? 
What the president didn’t say is that the abusive interrogation 
techniques that were the basis for the program are now 
criminalized. So while in theory he can continue to hold people in 
secret, he is clearly prohibited from engaging in the types of abuse 
that seem to be the entire basis and motivation for the program 
(Jennifer Daskal, n.d). 
The cumulative effect of these and other policies depicts a muscular 
attitude of the U.S. over the rest of the global community. Even so, the U.S. has 
allies, and many countries do value U.S. power only to accommodate their own 
interests. Many states keep silent for fear of retribution. This exists as the 
“Abilene Paradox” among states which will likely be exposed when the overall 
situation reaches its tipping point. The “Abilene Paradox” is the moment or 
situation where everyone in a group shares the same feelings but everyone at 
the same time keeps silent, thinking others don’t share their feelings.   
With that summary, the overall impression is that U.S. foreign policies do 
not carry enough positive image to establish sufficiently fruitful, relational trust 
among other states due to the U.S.’s duality, a tendency to achieve muscular 
influence in foreign policy and its denial or in some cases its willful ignorance of 
others’ values. The four general approaches to U.S. foreign policy given by Mead 
persist. U.S. policy makers, have used all four spectra to shape, reshape and fit 
new policy to what they view as U.S. interests. In fact, to describe it in a 
theoretical way, American foreign policy’s Jacksonian impulse of both deterrence 
and calculus-based trust are overriding the others due to a lack of axiological and 
fiduciary components in America’s acts and deeds.  
Many American politicians will argue that it is not foreign policy but rather 
the division between “haves” and “have nots” that cause others to not like 
Americans. These politician groups always point to third world countries as “have 
nots.” But if the division is between “haves” and “have nots”,  as the country’s 
politicians proclaim and most Americans also believe, why did the U.S. then fail 
21 
to obtain UN Security Council authorization for the invasion of Iraq? The U.S. 
also failed to initiate strong action against Iran. Since France, Russia, UK, 
Germany are considered “Haves,” then this can not represent a division between 
“haves” and “have nots”, but rather a race among those in the “haves” group. The 
issue is then who has relatively more and who has less.  
Those who have actually nothing will always tend to inflate the value of 
intangibles, such as honor, pride, etc. There is in fact no problem about what 
Americans are, but there are problems about what Americans do, which affects 
others and often hurts their pride and honor. It is true that the U.S. has done 
much internationally to help others, such as tsunami relief and earthquake aid in 
Indonesia and Pakistan respectively. The good impact on people’s thinking about 
the U.S. depends on the region. If we look at the polls, they show that after the 
2005 tsunami the Indonesian people’s opinion about the U.S. moved in a positive 
direction, whereas even after earthquake aid by the U.S. there was hardly any 
significant change among Pakistanis. Again, in most cases, this sort of 
humanitarian aid is viewed as a global political campaign by many, as in the case 
of the Middle East, where Israeli and American images have become so closely 
identified that they have became one. As a result, any incidents in the Middle 
East by Israel are considered to have automatic backing by the U.S.A., rather 
than suggesting the Middle Eastern countries’ own military incompetence. 
Among the four spectra, Jeffersonians could probably realize the impact of 
interventions on others’ honor and pride. American foreign policy should be more 
Jeffersonian, in line with popular American songs, movies, and American 
education system which are embraced by all willingly.       
C. IRAQ: AN EXAMPLE 
Overall, U.S. foreign policy projects an untrustworthy image. As a result, 
U.S. forces during the initial post re-construction phase in Iraq have had to 
struggle to change that image. Let us now analyze various events in Iraq, in 
order to determine how far the U.S. could build relational trust among Iraqis.  
The U.S. used Kurds in Iraq much as it used the Northern Alliance to 
defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. Historically, Kurds always wanted to separate 
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from Iraq and become a sovereign nation. After the first Gulf War, Saddam 
realized this weak link and attempted to build trust with Kurds. The U.S. trust link, 
however, remained strong with the Kurds. In OIF, the U.S. received good support 
from those Kurds. The Kurds later got rewarded in terms of investment by foreign 
companies in their region, and better control over the oil reserves in the Northern 
Iraq. They also got the opportunity to be more effective in the political setup of 
Iraq than ever before. Everything seemed to work out well as far as the U.S. 
overall plan was concerned. Unfortunately, what the U.S. did not realize was that 
their preset idea of using their trust relation with one faction would make it difficult 
for them to earn trust with the other factions, i.e., the Sunni and the Shiite.  
The Shiites rose from the dead after the U.S.’ “shock and awe” campaign 
settled down. It took them some time to realize that they were Shiites and not 
Iraqis. Who reminded them of this important fact? It was the U.S. The U.S. was 
forced to acknowledge the Shiites and their importance for two reasons: First, 
Shiites were the majority in Iraq and it was important to build trust with them; and 
second, the Ba’ath party mainly consisted of Sunnis who could not be trusted. 
Therefore, the U.S.’s pre-OIF trustworthy relationship with the Kurds, the post-
Iraq War build-up of trust with the Shiites to shift the power to them, and the 
constant reminders to Sunnis that you cannot be trusted because you are not 
Kurd or Shia resulted in distrust amongst various factions of Iraqis. It weakened 
the already fragile social fabric of Iraq, and strengthened the sub-national identity 
affiliations of the Iraqis. According to Wadhams and Bergmann, in Iraq there 
prevailed a “….overwhelming distrust and fear in a deeply polarized society that 
is also worried about the equitable distribution of power and resources” (2005).  
It was hoped that the revival of trust in the U.S. and amongst various 
factions would occur after the framing of a new Iraqi Constitution. Instead, the 
new constitution, written under the supervision of the U.S., increased distrust 
amongst the Iraqis in the following way: 
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• The parliament was made up of an “artificially constructed 
collection of ethnic and sectarian voting blocs” (Makiya, 2005). The 
influential people in the background controlling these blocs were 
given the power whereas the President and the Prime Minister 
were kept practically powerless.  
• The constitution not only allowed but encouraged the governorships 
and local administrations to be transformed into independent 
regions. Except for the Kurds, there were no homogeneous areas. 
The oil rich regions (mostly with Shiites and Kurds) were given 
additional benefits whereas the other areas (mostly Sunni 
dominated) were not given benefits, thus laying grounds for another 
dispute (Makiya, 2005).  
The U.S., in fact, cut the existing coherence among various factions of 
Iraqis, indeed creating chaos among various sects by reminding them of who is 
what in terms of Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd. Simultaneously, this sectarian chaos 
was enough to destabilize the social order. As a result, prevailing sectarian 
violence gave birth to feelings of division, insecurity of lives and materials, 
uneasiness, disconformities etc.  On the other hand, the U.S. is seen as 
incompetent in terms of restoring stability to Iraq. 
Many scholars argue that there were always identities among various 
sects in Iraq but that they could not make much out of this under Saddam 
regime. Saddam did a tremendous amount to create mutual distrust- one of the 
ways he maintained power. It is true that Saddam was an autocratic ruler and he 
did oppress many but he did so irrespective of sects even in case of his relatives. 
During his regime, in fact, he suppressed those he felt threatened him, whether 
Shitte, Sunni, or Kurds. In fact, Kurds were always isolated by everyone: by Iran, 
Syria, Turkey, and in Iraq. But when the U.S. realized that Shittes here also a 
major faction who could take control then they switched to the Shittes. But it was 
already too. As a result Iraq is now experiencing sectarian violence. But there 
was no insecurity during Saddam’s regime among the general people as he 
could maintain national unity. At present there is no national unity among various 
sects of Iraq due to chaos among the competing groups.   
Another important aspect of trust is the difference between the existing 
strong relationships and the ones that are newly created. Old and strong 
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relations can survive more than one incident of distrust, but for the newly created 
relations there is no margin of error. A single failure can bring the relationship 
back to “square one.” Therefore, each member of the military forces becomes 
important to building trust in post-war reconstruction. Even one failure can bring 
about unacceptable results. However, it can certainly be argued that it is 
practically impossible for the commanders to ensure good behavior by all 
personnel at all times. The unfortunate incidents at Abu Ghraib Prison and the 
Haditha incident (November 19, 2005) were yet another mistake which 
undermined relational trust. Here the Americans did not meet trust expectations 
of Iraqis due to bad behavior. According to Professor John Arquilla, the Abu 
Ghraib Prison incident may be the single most important failure of the U.S. forces 
that will cost the U.S. its trustworthiness around the world, and not only in Iraq. 
This gives many the feeling that other incidents like Abu Gharaib and Haditha are 
yet to be discovered. Similar offenses such as Marine Private Steven Green 
killing a whole family on March 12, 2006 after raping a 14 year old Iraqi girl brings 
such suspicions to mind.  
 One may argue that these acts were done by a few individuals who do 
not represent the average military personnel of the U.S. armed forces. But 
practically, each military person becomes a representative of the whole nation, 
and an action by one costs the whole nation’s image. As a consequence, the 
U.S. is seen as self-serving and not caring or benevolent towards Iraqis. Any 
series of incidents like Abu Gharaib, Haditha, teenager rape, killing families, or 
similar acts will naturally reinforce the belief that the exemption from Iraqi law 
given to U.S. forces by the UN Security Council encourages further brutal and 
psychotic acts. It is very natural to build the idea among the Iraqis that local 
commanders in Iraq have failed to ensure accountability of their soldiers even 
though they were put on trial.  
Iraq is moving towards an American form of government, a federal model 
which will establish new identities among different sects more deeply; to some 
extent similar to East and West Germany, North and South Korea, Independent 
Kashmir and Indian occupied Kashmir, Pakistani Punjab and Indian Punjab. Are 
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the Iraqis ready for such a new identity and geographical boundaries?  Every day 
there is a rise in the death toll, rapes, lootings, bombings, scarcity of water, 
electricity, gas etc. All these create a very strange environment and negative 
image with which Iraqis are not familiar.  This unfamiliarity, subsequently, 
changed Iraqis’ social routine such that now they find the landscape, topography, 
architecture, interiors, smell, taste, and image totally different. As a  
whole, whatever the pre-existing trust culture was among the Iraqis before the 
invasion of Iraq, at present, the U.S. is not trusted, as perceived expectations are 
not being met in the areas of capability, integrity, and benevolence.  
D. INTANGIBLES – PERCEIVED BUT NOT MET 
We humans tend to value tangible things and ignore those intangibles, 
which are mission critical. We cannot see those components, and they vary from 
culture to culture. We seldom realize that failure to nurture those in order to 
understand others feelings cost money, time and efforts in tangibles.  
My overriding impression was of an Army imbued with an 
unparalleled sense of patriotism, duty, passion, commitment, and 
determination with plenty of talent, and in no way lacking in 
humanity or compassion. Yet it seemed weighed down by 
bureaucracy, a stiflingly hierarchical outlook, a pre-disposition to 
offensive operations, and a sense that duty required all issues to be 
confronted head on (Brigadier Foster, 2005).  
The above statement is a professional comment by an experienced British 
senior officer based on his experiences in the Iraq theater. The British general 
made an attempt to understand the apparently paradoxical currents of strength 
and weakness witnessed at close hand over the course of a year. It is very 
difficult to find many facts about what is happening in Iraq even in the era of 
media freedom. All freedom virtually diminishes in the name of national security. 
Hence, the observations made by the British general who served at the heart of a 
U.S. dominated command within the coalition from December 2003 to November 
2004 may be taken as a reliable source of evidence from a neutral perspective. 
He points out many issues that are as follows: 
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• The U.S. Army acts as a fuel in a fire. 
• The U.S. Army personnel were too inclined to consider offensive 
operations. 
• Significant events were considered as a minor application of 
combat power and were not reported to a four star general by 
local commander. 
• U.S. military were pre-occupied with the perception that 
reluctance to use force will boost the insurgents’ courage and 
resilience. 
• U.S. military view total military destruction of the enemy as a 
strategic goal for success. 
• At various key decision points, the U.S. senior chain of command 
differed from its coalition opinion. 
• U.S. forces depend heavily on technology rather than HUMINT 
thus isolating them from the local population.   
• Despite the advantage of having a multi-cultural flavor, the Army 
was not culturally attuned to the environment. 
• U.S. forces encourage centralization and discourage low level 
initiative and innovation. (Brigadier Foster, 2005, emphasis mine.) 
The aforesaid British officer’s one single comment about dependency on 
technology rather than HUMINT, in my opinion, is good enough for the locals to 
think that the U.S. troops are distant. What’s more, many houses of Iraqi officers’ 
(who are working closely with the coalition) were searched several times by the 
U.S. force. Thus, the U.S force is not only creating isolation from the majority of 
the civil population but is also (unknowingly) creating feelings of distrust with Iraqi 
law enforcement agencies and the Iraqi administration. Since trust evokes trust, if 
the U.S. doesn’t trust Iraqi law enforcement agencies, then why should they 
place their trust in the U.S.?   
Brigadier Foster also comments that the U.S. force is not yet trained for 
unconventional warfare, as its attitude is heavily tuned to wage war with heavy 
equipment. In unconventional warfare where mass population support is required 
for winning “hearts and minds,” a heavy hand has a negative impact. The British 
brigadier general’s observation is further validated when the modified version of 
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the U.S. Army Soldier’s Creed is studied. This “Creed” is indoctrinated into the 
minds of all U.S. soldiers: 
Soldier’s Creed 
I am an American Soldier. 
I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United 
States and live the Army values. 
I will always place the mission first. 
I will never accept defeat. 
I will never quit. 
I will never leave a fallen comrade. 
I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in 
my warrior tasks and drills. 
I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself. 
I am an expert and I am a professional. 
I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United 
States of America in close combat. 
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life. 
I am an American Soldier. (The Soldier’s Creed, emphasis mine.) 
What is disturbing is that even though we intuitively know that gaining trust 
is very important for an occupying force, we have yet to embrace a universally 
accepted methodology to measure it. It is more or less evaluated by our 
perception bias. We often rely upon surveys and poll results to determine how 
people feel towards an occupying force, but there is little by which to gauge its 
significance. We often ignore various dimensions of intangible components, 
which are important in the formation of trust. It is very unfortunate to realize that 
the “Soldier’s Creed” omits intangible components from the U.S. force in respect 
to unconventional warfare or a post-reconstruction phase.  
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It was March 22, 2006. International students from the Naval Postgraduate 
School were in front of Capitol Hill for a programmed visit sponsored by the 
International Program Office (IPO). Everybody was required to open jackets, 
belts and, in some cases, shoes, though there were many scanning arches 
available. Among the students there were whispers heard to the effect that “they 
should learn courtesy.” The program that is sponsored every quarter by the IPO 
should build positive views of Americans and their institutions rather than 
resentment. It is often intangibles that lead people to express the view “they 
should learn courtesy.” Very minor and silly matters at a vulnerable time can act 
as a tipping point for grounding relational trust. One can only presume that not 
enough American commanders in Iraq or the members of Capitol Hill security 
force appreciate the feelings of pride and honor of being military officer or they 
wouldn’t inadvertently insult them.  
Dr Anna Simons of the United States Naval Postgraduate School points to 
Ethnographic Intelligence (EI) as an available tool. According to her, “What we 
mean by EI is information about indigenous forms of association, local means of 
organization, and traditional methods of mobilization. Clans, tribes, secret 
societies, the Hawala system, religious brotherhoods, all represent indigenous or 
latent forms of social organization available to our adversaries throughout the 
non-Western, and increasingly the Western world. These create networks that 
are invisible to us unless we are specifically looking for them; they come in forms 
with which we are not culturally familiar, and they are impossible to see or 
monitor, let alone map, without consistent attention and the right training” 
(Simons and Tucker, 2004). Dr. Simons points out the perfect missing 
components that are intangible as well as unfamiliar due to cultural difference. 
But the difficulty is making those intangibles visible in order to penetrate clans, 
tribes, secret societies, the Hawala system, religious brotherhoods, etc., which 
largely depend on trust. 
In a multicultural environment, we even don’t feel the need to be careful 
while uttering others’ names. It is very likely that we pronounce Chinese,  
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Japanese, Russian, or Arabic names incorrectly, because our ears are not tuned 
to those languages. However, this can be taken as a sign of disrespect in some 
cultures.  
The reliance of the U.S. on technology at the expense of developing 
greater skills in cross-cultural relations has undermined the development of 
informal networks. Distinct from other possible meanings of the phrase “informal 
network,” I am referring to the relationships that build beyond official norms 
through personal contacts, effort, meetings, email, or other means over a period 
of time. We should always remember that each individual abroad on a mission or 
even as a tourist is an ambassador of his country. The relationships that will 
develop in informal gatherings even on official missions often last forever. Wayne 
Lacey, a major of the United States Army, once shared a story with me about an 
experience when he was invited by an Afghan officer named LTC Karim to dine 
with him. 
My next challenge was lunch. As we prepared to dine, [LTC 
Karim’s] assistant came to wash our hands. Of course LTC Karim 
was first. I observed his actions and did the right things when it was 
my turn. I took a similar track through the rest of the meal, simply 
observing what was going on around me and emulating it as well as 
I could. LTC Karim commented to me that I looked like I’d been 
eating with my fingers all my life. - (Personal communication with 
Maj. Wayne Lacey, student of Naval Postgraduate School, 
Curriculum 699 on November 11, 2006).  
Though his hosts offered Maj. Lacey utensils, he declined to use them. As 
a result they were amazed to see a westerner eating with his fingers. However, 
their surprise quickly turned to indifference as they all became just a group of 
people eating together.  According to Maj. Lacey, “the act of dining together 
brought us closer. My willingness to observe their etiquette made a terrific 
bonding experience. LTC Karim invited me back to his tent several times, both 
for casual chat and dining, and later extended an invitation to visit him at his 




dishes that were offered, had he not taken advantage of such a great learning 
opportunity, he would not have been invited back. Maj. Lacey’s willingness to 
step into Afghan culture made him part of an informal network.  
It is to be remembered that the occupying force must always rely on locals 
to navigate the unfamiliar terrain and culture. Money will buy some information 
but not the most needed. The same information will be sold to various agencies 
by the agent to gain more money. Often this type of information is a combination 
of truth and falsehoods to make it partly plausible and partly misleading, whereas 
information based on trusted relationships will always contain the most accuracy. 
Many times it happens that an individual might be in a position to influence his 
country’s policy. Informal networks often make the job easier, and will put an 
individual at the center of friendship networks, whereas formal meetings make 
the same information more difficult. “One’s centrality in the [friendship] network is 
significantly related to one’s power” (Pfeffer, 1992). But Americans tend to ignore 
establishing relationships with individuals due to the notion that relationships can 
be established on an as-needed basis. 
It is not surprising that in some rural cultures (in Asia and to some extent 
in Arab region also) a thirsty passerby who asks for water will not be entertained 
with the glass of water only, but also with some bread or sugar or nuts along with 
a glass of water. Again, in these same cultures, an individual may find himself 
insulted if a person known to him does not invite him, as a courtesy, to share his 
food when they are together. These customs, when followed by culturally 
different people, often lead them to informal relations and into local networks. 
Once a person establishes informal relations among the locals, that person will 
gradually experience that many of his cultural mistakes will be overlooked. On 
the other hand, if no attempt is made initially, the lack of cultural engagement will 
give birth to resentment among the locals. Subsequently, a very minor mistake 
will be magnified and highlighted.  
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In many cultures (especially in the Arab world), women are still viewed as 
housewives. In some liberal cultures women are accepted in the working arena, 
but are yet to be fully embraced in the military discipline. In that type of culture if 
we ignore local sensibilities and deploy female officers and troops out of 
liberalism, and openness, our policy will never win the hearts and minds of those 
people.  
It is a very common tendency among South East Asian people to avoid 
taxes. The government has to make many efforts to elicit a person’s actual 
income, as in many cases transactions occur without any documentation. In 
these circumstances, in many parts of India, revenue officials recently engaged 
transsexuals to motivate people to pay taxes. Surprisingly, they collected 
400,000 rupees on their first day (India eunuchs turn tax collectors, 2006, 
November 9). What intangible component acted like magic in this case? In fact, 
Southeast Asian people believe that transsexuals have supernatural powers. If 
they are dissatisfied, this may bring disaster to a person or family. The Indian 
revenue officials cleverly made use of the intangible component of the trusting 
impulse for their tax collecting mission.  
The examples above are but a few of many. These types of intangible 
components do exist and vary from culture to culture, clan to clan, tribe to tribe.   
E. MEASURING TRUST 
Although it is difficult to reliably measure intangibles like levels of trust, 
one of the better models is the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) method 
developed by J. Richards Huerer (1999). It is a strong tool for analyzing 
important issues, which require careful weighing of alternative conclusions. It is 
an eight-step procedure that may be applied to controversial issues. What follows 
is a brief outline of the steps to be followed: 
• Identifying the possible hypothesis to be considered. 
• Making a list of significant evidence and arguments for and against 
each hypothesis. 
• Preparing a matrix with each hypothesis across the top and 
evidence down the side. 
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• Reconsidering the hypothesis and deleting evidence and 
arguments that have no diagnostic value. 
• Drawing tentative conclusions by trying to disprove the hypothesis 
against evidence rather than proving it.  
• Considering the consequences for analysis if that evidence were 
wrong, misleading, or subject to a different interpretation. 
• Discussing the relative likelihood of the entire hypothesis, not just 
the most likely one. 
• Identifying milestones for future observation that may indicate 
events are taking a different course than expected.  (Psychology of 
Intelligence Analysis, Chapter 8) 
As illustrated in Table 2, we will also place values of 1 and -1 in the matrix 
for consistent and inconsistent evidence respectively against each hypothesis. 
Finally we will accumulate all the inconsistent values (not the consistent ones) 
downward against each hypothesis. It may be mentioned that before adding 
down all the inconsistent values, we will multiply each by the corresponding 
inconsistent weight for credibility and relevance taken from either column I or 
column II of Table 1. The results in Table 2 use the weights in column I of Table 
1.     
 
33 













Table 1.   Weighted Inconsistency Counting Algorithm. 
 
One may use as many hypotheses as desired but here only four are applied to 
this model. The issue at hand is “Do Iraqis trust the U.S. or not?”  
• Hypothesis-1:  Iraqis trust U.S., as their expectations are being met. 
• Hypothesis-2:  Iraqis do not trust U.S., as Iraqi expectations are not 
met. 
• Hypothesis-3:  Iraqis trust the U.S., but the situation is not 
improving due to the U.S. military is not appreciating the allied 
force. 
• Hypothesis-4:  Iraqis think that it doesn’t matter whether they trust 
the U.S. or not, because the U.S. is following its own larger agenda 





  Source 
Type 
Credibility Relevance H-1  H – 2 H-3 H-4 
 Weighted Inconsistency score -9.828 -2.414 -5.828 -9.828 
Event Evidence        
E-1 Restoration of 
Democracy 
open Medium High -1 1 -1 1 
E-2 Imposing oil 
embargo post Desert 
Storm 
open High High -1 1 -1 -1 
E-3 Deterioration of Law 
and Order 
open High  Medium -1 1 1 -1 
E-4 Failure to restore 
basic amenities 
open Medium Medium -1 1 -1 -1 
E-5 Abu Gahraib and 
Haditha incident 
open High High -1 1 1 -1 
E-6 Switching support 
from Kurds to Shiites 
open Medium Medium -1 1 1 -1 
E-7 British Gen. 
expressed his 
dissatisfaction  for 
not paying respect to 
his thoughts 
open Medium Medium -1 -1 1 -1 
E-8 It was a long dream 
for Shiites, Kurds 
and most of the 
Sunni Iraqis to have 
freedom from 
Saddam autocracy  
open Medium High 1 -1 -1 -1 
 
Table 2.   Analysis of Computing Hypothesis. 
 
The above is an outline for the method. The positive or negative value I 
and II is to be given by individuals depending on the relativity of consistency and 
inconsistency of events. What appear in this second table are values I have 
inputted. One can also try this on his own using a software tool that can be found 
on the web at http://www2.parc.com/istl/projects/ach/ach.html. It is clear that 
hypothesis-2 has the least inconsistency among the four, and hypothesis-4 is the 
most inconsistent. As a result, we can conclude that Iraqis do not trust the U.S. 
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as it is perceived as being unable to fulfill Iraqis’ expectations. On the other hand, 
the level of misunderstanding with the allied force is also negatively affecting 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Do nations with international interests really consider intangibles before 
implementing a policy or conducting a military mission in a foreign area? 
According to Dr. Simons (personal communication through e-mail, October 8, 
2006), “the U.S. does not currently do an adequate job with ethnographic 
intelligence – not even when we conduct COIN [counter insurgency].” In such 
case, we cannot expect success through policies or missions.   
Scholars like Sztompka believe that experience influences human 
behavior as well as expectations. Many social scientists also believe that in the 
course of time, the social relationship structure (culture, experience) forges our 
underlying biology and shapes various forms of relational trust: fiduciary, 
axiological, and instrumental, in the area of benevolence, integrity, and capability 
respectively. I personally believe that biology determines the basic behavior and 
expectations of human beings; later, social relationships (which differ from 
culture to culture) allow the full expression of behavior in various stages of life, 
and strengthen the notion of humanity largely in terms of trust. In a previous 
chapter we have also seen Sztompka’s explanation regarding the shaping of the 
trusting impulse of various stages of life and noted his emphasis on socialization 
in shaping the trusting impulse.     
In many cases Americans do now pay more attention to foreign policies, 
COIN operations, and post-reconstruction missions but fail to see the real 
consequences of their actions. The economy plays a great role in shaping a 
nation’s socio-culture. The economic prosperity that had been envisioned by 
Alexander Hamilton played a great role in shaping the American socio-culture. A 
series of successful foreign policies like the Monroe doctrine, Chinese Open 
Door policy and others made American policy makers optimistic that problems 
could be solved. This notion gradually embedded itself in the developing national 
personality as emerging trust was met consistently. As a result, these  
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consistencies affecting the trusting impulse towards fiduciary and axiological trust 
were shaped by egoism. Later on, in the military, the “Soldier’s Creed” further 
validated this egoism. 
The achievement of the Americans makes their country a superpower in 
the world. This hierarchical positioning subsequently enhances egoism, the belief 
that “might makes right.” All these notions are gradually absorbed into the 
trusting impulse. As a result, past failures and lessons learned are shaped by 
Americans’ model as they look through their own lens and bury the intangibles 
attached to the issues. This develops in the American mind through the 
socialization process. As mentioned earlier, that socialization process determines 
the nature of the trusting impulse; thus, various egoism notions are being 
engrained in Americans during their upbringing when they find their immediate 
environment is that of a superpower. Again, all these thoughts get 
institutionalized through bureaucratic and military organizations. To use a 
common modern image, American culture and personality is the software 
whereas the bureaucratic military complex is the hardware of the Americans’ 
trusting impulse. It is just like the software inside the hardware of a PC. 
An American, during his upbringing, develops the notion of thinking 
himself superior to individuals of other nations. With the same thinking, once the 
American joins a bureaucratic institution and the military, he tends to become 
even more rigid in his thinking. The bureaucratic structure puts more rules in the 
way of his trusting impulse, and thus he ends up rejecting any contradiction to 
“his way” rather than considering the “other’s way.” 
“In God We Trust,” a phrase written on the back of a dollar bill, explains 
the relationship of trust with belief in a seen and certain thing (the dollar bill). 
Obviously, trust in God means a belief in an unseen and uncertain power. 
Therefore, trust embeds an element of uncertainty and risk about an unseen 
future. It is greatly affected by external inputs in terms of knowledge and identity 
that makes calculation possible and deterrence credible. The measure of trust is 
never a simple and standard calculation. An economist may measure it in terms 
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of lending money and how much he is getting back from the trustee; skeptical 
readers may find some gap in surveys as the answers often vary in light of how 
questions are presented. In my opinion, “trust” is intangible and difficult to 
measure. Trust lies in those intangibles that are mentioned in the previous 
chapter. It can only be felt. On a military mission, feelings may get overridden by 
the aims and objectives of the campaign, feelings of frustration over the resisting 
forces, a sense of overwhelming-ness and supremacy etc. These feelings, more 
often than not, result in actions exactly opposite to those that can help in building 
trust. For military units, it is essential to remember how the local people view your 
actions, not only after, but also before and during the campaign.  It has to be 
remembered that the “occupiers” are the one who have to gain the trust of the 
“occupied”; this is an effort more difficult than rebuilding infrastructure.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are made, based on the discussion 
above: 
• American policy should not attempt to put in place the “American 
way of life” in foreign operations. In fact, it is far better to rally the 
people by convincing them that their own way of life will be honored 
instead. This has relevance to the present situation in Iraq. Instead 
of pushing for the “democratic way of American life,” the U.S. 
should push for the “Islamic way of democratic life.” The end result 
may be the same, but the reaction by the people would be different. 
• The military officers for post-reconstruction missions must have 
adequate knowledge of intangible components for a particular 
culture while dealing with the locals.   
• The trusting impulse should be shaped with benevolence and fair 
activities during the early stages of life. 
• It is true that the institutional culture of the U.S. military as laid out 
in the Soldier’s Creed is helpful in making the soldier devoted to 
duty. At the same time it is also not very compatible with 
establishing trust relations. Since trust relations are central to 
winning “hearts and minds,” the U.S. military force is not well suited 
to win in the post-war phase.  
• A separate force apart from the military should be created just to 
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